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WHY GEORGIA SHOULD GET OFF THE BENCH 
AND PROFIT FROM THE INEVITABILITY OF 
SPORTS BETTING 
Andrew Smith* 
INTRODUCTION 
Although Americans bet an estimated $80 to $380 billion annually 
on sporting events, only about $2.5 billion was wagered legally 
before May 14, 2018.1 Framed differently, at a minimum, the 
government has forgone collecting tax revenues on approximately 
$75.2 billion. Rather than retain the power to tax this figure, 
Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
(PASPA) in 1992, which prohibited sports betting outside Nevada.2 
In spite of the government’s predilection for regulated oversight to 
reduce corruption, Congress believed a legalized sports betting 
market would increase fraud and ruin the integrity of sports.3 While 
the federal government cast a scarlet letter on sports betting, 
individual states retained discretion regarding the legality of other 
forms of gambling, such as casinos and lotteries.4 Despite its 
                                                                                                             
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Georgia State University College of Law. I want to give a special thanks to my 
fellow members of the Georgia State University Law Review for all of your time and effort leading up to 
publication of this Note. 
 1. NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 2–14 (1999); see also Michael 
Levinson, A Sure Bet: Why New Jersey Would Benefit from Legalized Sports Wagering, 13 SPORTS L.J. 
143, 144 (2006); Andrew Vacca, Sports Betting: Why the United States Should Go All In, 11 
WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 1, 1 (2014). 
 2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2018); see also Andrew Brandt, Professional Sports Leagues’ Big Bet: 
“Evolving” Attitudes on Gambling, 28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 277–78 (2017) (describing how the 
preexisting sports betting practices in Delaware, Montana, Oregon, and Nevada granted these states 
exemptions from PASPA, and noting only Nevada offered full-scale sports betting on professional and 
collegiate sporting events, whereas the Delaware and Oregon lotteries each only allowed multi-game 
parlay betting on National Football League games). 
 3. Justin Fielkow, Daniel Werly & Andrew Sensi, Tackling PASPA: The Past, Present, and Future 
of Sports Gambling in America, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 23, 30–31 (2016); Christopher Polisano, Betting 
Against PASPA: Why the Federal Restrictions on Sports Gambling Are Unconstitutional and How They 
Hurt the States, 25 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 453, 459 (2018). 
 4. Daniel N. Clay, Playing the Odds: The Realities of State-By-State Suitability Determinations and 
the Need for Federal Regulation, 8 UNLV GAMING L.J. 79, 80–81 (2018) (noting how courts have 
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prohibition, America’s affinity to bet on sports only rose, and the rise 
of illegal bookmakers and offshore markets virtually neutered 
PASPA’s efficacy. Moreover, in reality, the effect of PASPA 
shriveled the pool of money used legally to bet on sports and 
effectively shielded millions of dollars from government taxation 
each year. 
Influenced by the inevitability of sports betting and changes in 
public perception, the Supreme Court of the United States struck 
down PASPA on May 14, 2018.5 Each state now retains the ability to 
decide for itself the legality of sports betting.6 In light of such 
retained state discretion, this Note examines whether Georgia should 
legalize sports betting and assesses the potential legislative and 
regulatory challenges that would arise. Part I discusses the history of 
gambling in America and the state of gambling in Georgia. Part II 
examines particular states that have legalized sports betting and 
compares their legislative and regulatory schemes with Georgia’s 
existing gambling framework.7 Part III assesses and proposes 
different structures that would allow for Georgia to legalize sports 
betting. 
I.   Background 
The appearance of gambling in America coincides directly with 
the arrival of the earliest Puritan colonists who played dice, played 
card games, and bet on horse races. These activities, however, 
opposed Puritan ideology and were quickly outlawed.8 Although the 
                                                                                                             
recognized the ability of states to regulate various games of chance and grant casino licenses). 
 5. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1461 (2018) New Jersey argued PASPA violated the 
anti-commandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court ultimately determined 
PASPA was unconstitutional. Id. In effect, the federal ban on sports betting was removed and individual 
states are now able to determine the legality of sports betting. Id. 
 6. Id. at 1484–85. 
 7. This Note will primarily address the sports betting structures in Nevada, New Jersey, Delaware, 
and Mississippi. Although, as of November 1, 2019, thirteen states have implemented legalized sports 
betting. Predominately each state that has subsequently legalized has broadly mirrored its legislative 
model based on Nevada’s existing framework, while at the same time tailoring the regulatory and 
taxation aspects of legal sports betting to best fit their respective social and economic agendas. 
 8. Sarah Remes, Legalizing America’s New Pastime: Teaming Up with the House for Pari-Mutuel 
Sports Betting, 16 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 551, 552 (2016). Puritan ideals opposed 
unproductive activities and, in 1633, the Massachusetts Bay Colony passed the first anti-gambling law, 
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early colonies similarly outlawed gambling, lottery participation was 
encouraged as a necessary fundraising remedy to help struggling 
settlements.9 Lacking a strong central government, the Continental 
Congress even used lottery revenues to fund the Revolutionary 
War.10 However, public perception of state-sponsored lotteries 
decreased throughout the early nineteenth century as a result of 
widespread fraud and misappropriation of funds.11 By the end of the 
nineteenth century, state legislatures had almost universally banned 
state lotteries, and they did not reappear until the 1960s.12 
As lotteries disappeared, organized horse racing appeared, and by 
1890, 314 tracks were operating across the country.13 Despite the 
formation of the American Jockey Club, which was created in part to 
combat corruption, fraud continued to plague the industry.14 By 1908, 
this instability, combined with the Progressive Movement’s 
anti-gambling sentiment, left the nation with only twenty-five 
tracks.15 However, in 1908, pari-mutuel betting was introduced. 
Although this form of gambling served to stabilize the horseracing 
industry, interest in horseracing would fluctuate greatly throughout 
                                                                                                             
the Idleness Statute of 1633, which outlawed the possession of cards, dice, and gaming tables. Id. See 
generally George G. Fenich, A Chronology of (Legal) Gaming in the U.S., 3 GAMING RES. & REV. 65 
(1996). 
 9. Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical Examination of 
State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 24 (1992). In 1612, the Virginia Company of London 
held a lottery to raise funds for the Jamestown settlement and by the eighteenth century, 
colony-sanctioned lotteries helped establish universities, churches, and libraries. Id. at 25–26. 
 10. Horner v. United States, 147 U.S. 449, 458 (1893) (describing how the Continental Congress 
authorized a lottery to raise funds during the Revolutionary War); see also Rychlak, supra note 9, at 12, 
29. 
 11. Rychlak, supra note 9, at 35. See generally HERBERT ASBURY, SUCKER’S PROGRESS: AN 
INFORMAL HISTORY OF GAMBLING IN AMERICA FROM THE COLONIES TO CANFIELD (1938). 
 12. Rychlak, supra note 9, at 42–44 (stating Louisiana remained the only state with a lottery until 
1895, when Congress banned all lottery materials from interstate commerce, and it was not until 1964 
that New Hampshire introduced a state-run lottery to help fund the state’s school system). 
 13. Luke P. Breslin, Reclaiming the Glory in the “Sport of Kings”—Uniformity is the Answer, 20 
SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 297, 301 (2010); Joan S. Howland, Let’s Not “Spit the Bit” in 
Defense of “The Law of the Horse”: The Historical and Legal Development of American Thoroughbred 
Racing, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 473, 496 (2004). 
 14. Howland, supra note 13, at 495–96. The American Jockey Club was established to “promote the 
improvement of horses, to elevate the public taste in sports of the turf, and to become an authority on 
racing matters in the country.” Id. at 495. 
 15. Breslin, supra note 13; Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 26. 
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the ensuing decades.16 Nevertheless, all other forms of gambling 
were almost uniformly outlawed across the country throughout the 
early twentieth century.17 
A. The Rise of Modern Sports Betting 
As interest in horseracing declined, Americans began illegally 
betting on baseball games through organized crime syndicates.18 
While baseball’s popularity exploded after World War I, the 1919 
“Black Sox Scandal” brought national attention to illegal sports 
gambling and immediately crippled the public’s perception of sports 
gambling.19 The scandal involved members of the Chicago White 
Sox, who were accused of receiving money in exchange for 
intentionally losing the 1919 World Series.20 In the aftermath of the 
scandal, Major League Baseball (MLB) appointed Judge Kenesaw 
Mountain Landis as the first commissioner of any professional sports 
league to protect the “integrity of the game.”21 Despite the 
appointment, corruption in MLB continued, and the public’s 
perception of sports betting only worsened when Pete Rose, the 
all-time MLB leader in hits, was found to have gambled on games 
while he was the manager of the Cincinnati Reds.22 
 
                                                                                                             
 16. Breslin, supra note 13, at 301–02; Remes, supra note 8, at 569. Pari-mutuel betting is a pooled 
system of betting where the winners divide the total amount wagered in proportion to the sums they 
have wagered individually. Id. at 568–69. 
 17. Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 26. See generally I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: The 
Third Wave of Legal Gambling, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 361 (2010) (providing a comprehensive 
overview of the historical development of American horse racing). 
 18. Chil Woo, All Bets Are Off: Revisiting the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
(PASPA), 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 569, 572 (2013) (detailing how the rise in popularity of 
professional baseball, in conjunction with illegal gambling laws, allowed organized crime to create their 
own underground sports gambling empire); Polisano, supra note 3, at 456–57. 
 19. Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 26; Woo, supra note 18, at 572–73 (describing the perception that 
after the “Black Sox Scandal,” organized crime threatened the sanctity of sports). 
 20. Brandt, supra note 2, at 275; Polisano, supra note 3, at 458–59. The scandal involved several 
members of the Chicago White Sox who would receive payment from organized crime members 
associated with famous New York mobster Arnold Rothstein. Id. at 458–59. As a result of the scandal, 
eight players were banned from baseball. Id. 
 21. Brandt, supra note 2, at 275. 
 22. Polisano, supra note 3, at 458; Woo, supra note 18, at 575. 
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1.   Sports Betting Basics & Nevada’s Legalized Sports Betting 
Monopoly 
Similar to investing in a company’s public stock, sports wagering 
generally entails committing an immediate cash outlay while making 
a prediction about a future performance. Various types of wagers 
exist, and the most common forms of betting include point-spread 
bets,23 money-line bets,24 and parlay bets.25 To insulate themselves 
from volatility and to ensure a profit, sportsbooks and other entities 
that accept wagers will charge a commission on each bet, 
colloquially called the “vig.”26 As a result, sportsbooks develop 
betting spreads that seek to attract half of the bettors on one team and 
the other half of bettors on the other team.27 
While other states continued to prohibit sports gambling, Nevada 
capitalized on this lucrative activity and became the first state to 
legalize sports betting in 1949.28 Nevada initially imposed a 10% tax 
on all sports bets and accordingly, the tax confined sports betting to 
                                                                                                             
 23. BO J. BERNHARD ET AL., UNLV INT’L GAMING INST., PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS IN LAS 
VEGAS: WHAT THE RESEARCH SAYS, 8–9 (2016); Jeff Harris, What Is a Sportsbook? (And How Does 
Such a Business Make Money?), GAMBLING SITES (June 9, 2018), 
https://www.gamblingsites.org/blog/what-is-a-sports-book-and-how-does-such-a-business-make-money/ 
[https://perma.cc/5FGL-AUGM]. The point-spread takes into account the relative strength of a team 
versus its opposition and levels the playing field by requiring the “perceived” stronger team to win by a 
certain amount of points. Harris, supra. For example, a wager on an “underdog,” (i.e., the perceived 
weaker team) can afford for the team to lose the game and still collect a winning ticket so long as the 
underdog does not lose by more than the point-spread. Id. 
 24. BERNHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 9. A money-line bet does not include a point-spread and 
only requires bettors to pick the victorious team to win their wager. Id. 
 25. Id. Parlay betting must include at least two or more bets and requires the bettor to accurately 
select the outcome of each event to collect a winning ticket. Id. Consequently, parlay bets are more 
difficult to win, yet at the same time are attractive because potential profits are amplified. Id.  
 26. Id. at 9–10. When an individual bets on the point-spread, the bet is discounted by the vig, which 
normally averages around 1.1. BERNHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 9–10. Thus, for example, a bettor 
who wagers eleven dollars may only stand to win ten dollars with a vig of 1.1. Id.; see also DAVID G. 
SCHWARTZ, UNLV CTR. GAMING RES., NEVADA SPORTS BETTING TOTALS: 1984–2018, at 2 (2019). 
Like other forms of gambling, the old adage “the house always wins” applies equally to sports 
gambling, and Nevada sportsbooks have posted positive annual revenues for thirty-three consecutive 
years. SCHWARTZ, supra. 
 27. BERNHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 9–10. When making a hypothetical point-spread bet, a 
bettor must pay eleven dollars and in return would win only ten dollars. Id. Under ideal circumstances, if 
the sportsbook receives equal amounts of wagers on both sides, then a sportsbook has guaranteed itself a 
profit. Id. 
 28. Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 26–27; Woo, supra note 18, at 573. 
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small clubs and organized crime.29 By 1983, Nevada reduced the tax 
to 0.25%, and the economics of sports betting encouraged Las Vegas 
casinos to open and operate their own sportsbooks.30 As the only 
state to offer unrestricted sports betting, Nevada developed and 
refined a regulatory system that protects against corruption and 
produces honest wager outcomes.31 At the same time, Nevada has 
also benefitted from its de facto sports betting monopoly. In 2017, 
Nevada sportsbooks handled $4.8 billion in bets and reported revenue 
of $248.8 million.32 For Super Bowl LII alone, Nevada sportsbooks 
accepted $138.5 million in bets, although this figure pales in 
comparison to the $4.6 billion the American Gambling Association 
estimates people bet illegally on the game.33 
2.   Legislative Action 
To combat illegal sports gambling, Congress passed the Interstate 
Wire Act of 1961 to curb organized crime’s underground 
bookmaking operation.34 Aimed primarily at “bookies” and not 
                                                                                                             
 29. Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 27 (describing the prevalence of organized crime in the years 
shortly after Nevada legalized sports gambling); Eric Meer, The Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act (PASPA): A Bad Bet For the States, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 281, 287 (2011) (describing 
Congress’s intention that a high tax would discourage sports betting). 
 30. Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 27 (detailing the lucrative financial impact that resulted from 
Congress’s tax reduction); see also Joshua Winneker, Ira Sprotzer & Lindsay Demery, Sports Gambling 
and the Expanded Sovereignty Doctrine, 13 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 38, 40 (2013). See generally 
Nevada Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP., (Jan. 9, 2020, 11:26 AM), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/nevada/ [https://perma.cc/2SU8-GXQ8]. A sportsbook is a physical 
location, traditionally located within a casino, which is permitted to accept bets and is responsible for 
creating and posting point-spreads and betting odds for sporting events. Nevada Sports Betting, supra. 
 31. Keith C. Miller & Anthony N. Cabot, Regulatory Models for Sports Wagering: The Debate 
Between State vs. Federal Oversight, 8 UNLV GAMING L.J. 153, 164 (2018) (describing the licensing, 
accounting, audit, and enforcement regulations established in Nevada and how other states will look to 
replicate the Nevada model). 
 32. Dustin Gouker, Nevada Sportsbooks Set Record with a Quarter of a Billion Dollars of Revenue 
in 2017, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Jan. 31. 2018, 8:09 AM), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/18130/nevada-sportsbooks-2017/ [https://perma.cc/YD9K-JCFT]. 
 33. Press Release, Am. Gaming Ass’n, Americans to Wager More than $4.6 Billion Illegally on 
Super Bowl LII (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.americangaming.org/new/americans-to-wager-more-than-
4-6-billion-illegally-on-super-bowl-52/ [https://perma.cc/N7GB-WXCF].  
 34. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2018); see Miller & Cabot, supra note 31, at 154 (discussing how federal 
intervention was needed due to the difficulties of individual states investigating and prosecuting 
organized crime syndicates operating throughout multiple states); see also 38 AM. JUR. 2D 
Gambling § 33 (1999) (defining “bookmaking” as an operation that involves both the placing of bets 
and the paying off or collection of debts). 
6
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bettors, the Interstate Wire Act made it illegal for anyone engaged in 
the business of betting to use a wired communication to accept or 
facilitate interstate bets.35 Despite further congressional action aimed 
at reducing organized crime’s underground sports gambling 
operations, illegal betting and bookmaking thrived throughout the 
1970s and 1980s.36 Notably, in 1976, the Commission on the Review 
of the National Policy Toward Gambling proclaimed “effective 
gambling law enforcement [is] an impossible task,” and although the 
Commission recommended the current prohibitions remain, it 
deemphasized enforcement against illegal sports wagering.37 
Despite nearly all states prohibiting sports betting, corruption 
continued to plague professional and collegiate sports leagues. In 
1978, a member of the Boston College men’s basketball team was 
convicted of conspiracy to commit sports bribery after being found 
implicated in a point-shaving scheme that involved members of 
organized crime.38 Further, in 2007, a National Basketball 
Association (NBA) referee, Tim Donaghy, was convicted and 
imprisoned after being found to have personally accepted bribes and 
placed bets on basketball games that he officiated.39 
                                                                                                             
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 1084; Remes, supra note 8, at 560. 
 36. COMM’N ON THE REVIEW OF THE NAT’L POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN 
AMERICA IX (1976) [hereinafter GAMBLING IN AMERICA] (finding that over two-thirds of the 
population gambled in some form and 80% approved of gambling); see also Jeffrey Rodefer, Federal 
Wire Wager Act, GAMBLING-LAW-US.COM, http://www.gambling-law-us.com/Federal-Laws/wire-
act.htm [https://perma.cc/SMD6-9LVX] (providing an overview of the Wire Act and describing how the 
Wire Act complements other federal bookmaking statutes, such as the Travel Act, the Interstate 
Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act). 
 37. See GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 36. Commission did not believe a regulated single-event 
sports wagering framework would provide sufficient tax revenues to states. Id. at 4; see also Fielkow et 
al., supra note 3, at 28. 
 38. Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 29. See generally Ray Gustini, How Point Shaving Works, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2011/04/how-point-
shaving-works/349575/ [https://perma.cc/Y6ZC-7QX4]. Point-shaving entails bribing specific players 
or coaches into making certain in-game decisions to ensure the outcome of a sports bet. Gustini, supra. 
Point-shaving occurs more frequently in collegiate sports as amateur athletes are not compensated and 
collegiate referees have lower salaries compared to professionals. Id.; John Underwood, The Biggest 
Game in Town, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 10, 1986), http://www.si.com/vault/1986/03/10/638301/the-
biggest-game-in-town [https://perma.cc/SQU6-C86N] (explaining the point-shaving scheme involving 
Boston College basketball players during the 1978–1979 season). 
 39. United States v. Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). National Basketball 
Association (NBA) referee Tim Donaghy was sentenced to fifteen months in prison for conspiracy to 
engage in wire fraud and transmitting betting information through interstate commerce. Martha Neil, 
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Although most states independently prohibited sports betting, 
Congress remained largely silent on the topic and instead deferred to 
state lawmakers in a manner consistent with congressional 
involvement regarding the legality of other forms of gambling.40 
However, on October 28, 1992, Congress, with the support of the 
major professional leagues, enacted PASPA, which virtually 
prevented any government entity or individual from sponsoring or 
authorizing wagering on either professional or amateur athletic 
events.41 Created to protect the integrity of sports and shield 
America’s youth from unvirtuous ideals, PASPA effectively made 
sports gambling illegal nationwide.42 Notably, however, Delaware, 
Montana, Nevada, and Oregon received exemptions from PASPA as 
each of these states previously offered sports wagering in some 
form.43 
B.   Public Acceptance of Sports Betting 
In the years after PASPA’s enactment, illegal sports betting 
continued to grow, and despite the prohibition, nonregulated outlets, 
such as illegal bookmakers and offshore betting companies, 
continued to provide a host of avenues to wager on sports.44 With 
                                                                                                             
Ex-NBA Referee Tom Donaghy Gets 15 Months in Gambling Case, ABA J. (July 29, 2008, 10:31 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ex_nba_referee_tim_donaghy_gets_15_months_in_gambling_c
ase [https://perma.cc/YHA9-N9VR]. 
 40. Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 29. 
 41. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2018); see also Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 30–32 (enumerating the 
motivations of professional sports leagues to prohibit sports betting). See generally S. REP. NO. 102-248 
(1991) (discussing the rationale for seeking a federal ban on sports betting and listing individuals who 
voiced support for legislation prohibiting sports gambling, including commissioners of NFL, NBA, 
NHL, and MLB). 
 42. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (discussing how former NFL commissioner Paul Tagliabue testified 
before Congress and vehemently opposed sports betting, stating “the spread of legalized sports gambling 
would change forever—and for the worse—what our game stands for”); see also Woo, supra note 18, at 
587. 
 43. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704; see also Brandt, supra note 2. 
 44. Eric J. Carlson, Drawing Dead: Recognizing Problems with Congress’ Attempt to Regulate the 
Online Gambling Industry and the Negative Repercussions to International Trade, 32 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 135, 154–55 (2008) (describing how Congress’s restrictions are limited to United 
States borders and the majority of online gambling businesses are operated by foreign companies). See 
Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Sports Betting Has an Equal Sovereignty Problem, 67 DUKE 
L.J. ONLINE 1, 34 (2017) (classifying PASPA as pre-internet legislation that is ill-suited for the modern 
day). 
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increased popularity, the negative stigma that previously 
accompanied illegal wagering gradually dissolved, leading the 
general public, politicians, and sporting executives to entertain and 
even encourage legalization.45 Essentially, it became evident to these 
former opponents that sports betting had become a normative social 
activity. Although measuring the amount bet in unregulated markets 
is impossible, a 2015 Ernst & Young survey found that 28% of 
American adults bet on sports and estimated these adults wagered 
approximately $107 billion annually.46 Alternatively, a 1999 report 
by the National Gaming Impact Study Commission estimated the 
illegal sports betting market to be between $80 and $380 billion.47 
The amount Americans wagered annually in illegal markets caused 
many politicians to succumb to the realization of sports betting’s 
impactful societal presence and suppress their moral concerns in 
favor of the economic and civic benefits that could be derived from 
taxing a regulated market.48 A recent study from Eilers & Krejcik 
Gaming, LLC estimated legalization could yield up to $16 billion 
collectively in annual tax revenues if the majority of states 
implemented sports betting markets.49 Paralleling the public’s 
acceptance of sports betting, the commissioners of the major 
American sports leagues, which all previously opposed sports 
gambling, have publicly advocated for a legalized regulatory 
framework.50 Noting these changing attitudes, on May 14, 2018, the 
                                                                                                             
 45. Michelle Minton, Legalizing Sports Betting in the United States, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE 
INST. (Mar. 15, 2018), https://cei.org/content/legalizing-sports-betting-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/P32K-Q9TM]. See generally David Purdum, Inside How Sports Betting Went 
Mainstream, ESPN (Aug. 9, 2018), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/24310393/gambling-how-
media-daily-fantasy-new-thinking-us-pro-sports-commissioners-helped-sports-betting-become-accepted 
[https://perma.cc/DXL5-7EFP]. 
 46. OXFORD ECON., ECONOMIC IMPACT OF LEGALIZED SPORTS BETTING 8 (May 2017), 
https://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/AGA-Oxford%20-%20Sports%20Betting% 
20Economic%20Impact%20Report1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LYE-GCCR]. 
 47. Id. (detailing the inherent difficulties in measuring the scope of illegal sports betting); see also 
NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, supra note 1.  
 48. Minton, supra note 45; Purdum, supra note 45. 
 49. Minton, supra note 45. 
 50. See, e.g., Adam Silver, Legalize and Regulate Sports Betting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/opinion/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-legalize-sports-
betting.html [https://perma.cc/VUC6-MZ4G] (“[T]he laws on sports betting should be changed. 
Congress should adopt a federal framework that allows states to authorize betting on professional sports, 
9
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Supreme Court in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association 
struck down PASPA and restored states’ rights to legalize and 
regulate sports betting.51 Within only a few weeks of the Court’s 
decision, Delaware and New Jersey quickly legalized and began 
accepting wagers on sports, and in the eighteen months following 
Murphy, a total of thirteen states legalized and implemented 
full-scale sports gambling.52 
Unlike many states, the Georgia legislature has not formally 
addressed the legalization of sports gambling following Murphy; 
however, a senate committee has been formed to study the issue and 
possibly introduce a sports betting bill during the 2020 legislative 
session.53 Although the Georgia Constitution has some of the most 
restrictive language regarding gambling, three legal forms of 
gambling exist in the Peach State: a state lottery, bingo, and raffles.54 
In 1992, Georgia voters approved a state lottery to fund the HOPE 
Scholarship, which awards in-state collegiate scholarships to Georgia 
residents.55 Since its implementation, the scholarship has provided 
more than $18.7 billion and helped over 1.7 million Georgia students 
attend college.56 Although the Georgia Constitution was amended to 
                                                                                                             
subject to strict regulatory requirements and technological safeguards.”).  
 51. See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018). 
 52. See generally Legislative Tracker: Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Jan. 11, 2020, 12:24 
PM), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sportsbetting-bill-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/8S8G-VWSK]. 
 53. Jim Galloway, A New Front in Georgia’s Fight over Gambling: Sports Betting, ATLANTA 
J.-CONST. (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/new-front-georgia-fight-over-gambling-
sports-betting/2AMqzgUcQmARZjVjarp56K/ [https://perma.cc/9MUE-GB6D]. 
 54. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 8 (“[A]ll forms of pari-mutuel betting and casino gambling are 
hereby prohibited.”); Bingo, GA. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://gbi.georgia.gov/bingo 
[https://perma.cc/5EUD-T3HW] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020); see also Phillip Conneller, Georgia 
Republican Dreaming of Three Multi-Billion Dollar Integrated Resorts, CASINO.ORG (Aug. 2, 2018), 
https://www.casino.org/news/georgia-republican-dreaming-of-three-multibillion-dollar-integrated-
resorts [https://perma.cc/2ENS-YT4Z] (noting Georgia is one of only nine states in the United States 
that does not offer either commercial or Indian casino gaming). 
 55. Michael Lanford, The Political History of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship Program: A Critical 
Analysis, 1 POL’Y REVIEWS HIGHER EDUC. 8–9, 18 (2017). Due to the language in the Georgia 
Constitution, the Hope Scholarship had to pass a state referendum, and ultimately Georgia voters 
narrowly approved the lottery by a vote of 1,146,340 to 1,050,674. Id. 
 56. Press Release, Ga. Lottery Corp., Georgia Lottery Transfers over $1.1B to Education (July 18, 
2017), https://www.galottery.com/en-us/media-center/pressreleaseinput/2017/july/georgia-lottery-
transfers-over-a-billion-to-education.html [https://perma.cc/7NLH-JWGW]. 
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permit a lottery, Georgia politicians have been unsuccessful in 
legalizing casinos and other forms of gambling.57 
Nevertheless, as neighboring states begin to profit from legalized 
sports gambling while also generating income from visiting Georgia 
residents, pressure to address the future of sports betting in Georgia 
will quickly mount. Rather than forego these tax revenues, Georgia 
should confront the inevitability of sports betting and institute its own 
regulatory regime. 
II.   Analysis 
A.   Nevada Framework 
States that have legalized sports betting have generally emulated 
Nevada’s regulatory framework to ensure bettors wager in a fair and 
transparent environment.58 Specifically, the Nevada Act and 
Regulations govern state gaming and empower the Nevada Gaming 
Commission and Nevada Gaming Control Board to regulate the 
gaming industry.59 Nevada offers sports betting through physical 
casino sportsbooks, whereby an individual may place a bet directly 
                                                                                                             
 57. Griffin Hamstead, Casino Bill Fails in Committee, RED & BLACK (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.redandblack.com/athensnews/casino-bill-fails-in-committee/article_f88f576a-fd52-11e6-
b673-37a7b19aa354.html [https://perma.cc/CV8A-E3J3]. In February 2017, Senate Bill 79 sought to 
authorize the licensing of two destination resorts in Georgia and included a 20% tax on revenue 
earmarked for the Hope Scholarship fund, rural health care and rural broadband technology. Id. The year 
prior, Senate Bill 264 sought to legalize wagering on state horse races but fell two votes shy of reaching 
the Senate floor. Id. 
 58. Miller & Cabot, supra note 31. See generally NEV. GAMING COMM’N & NEV. STATE GAMING 
CONTROL BD. 8 (2014), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/LegInfo/Orientation/2014-
15/Handouts/03-JudHandouts_Gaming.pdf [https://perma.cc/LU9F-U7TC] [hereinafter NEV. GAMING 
COMM’N]; Adam Candee, Is It ‘Revenue Sharing’ or High Taxes for Sports Betting? Ask Rhode Island, 
Delaware How They Slice the Pie, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (July 3, 2018), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/21663/sports-betting-revenue-sharing/ [https://perma.cc/3HEJ-
YST7]. 
 59. BERNHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 22; NEV. GAMING COMM’N, supra note 58, at 8. The 
Commission consists of five Governor-appointed members and is responsible for authorizing gaming 
licensing and ensuring that operators adhere to state gaming laws. NEV. GAMING COMM’N, supra note 
58, at 3–4. The Control Board consists of six divisions (Administration, Audit, Enforcement, 
Investigations, Tax and License, and Technology) and seeks “to protect the stability of the gaming 
industry through investigations, licensing, and enforcement of laws and regulations; to ensure the 
collection of gaming taxes and fees an essential source of state revenue; and to maintain public 
confidence in gaming.” Id. at 6–7. 
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with a cashier; licensed companies also provide mobile services.60 To 
place a mobile bet, an individual must first establish an account, in 
person, at a licensed sportsbook, and thereafter may wager indirectly 
through a sports betting application; however, these applications use 
geolocation tracking to make sure the bet is placed within Nevada’s 
borders.61 Further restrictions were implemented to prevent 
match-fixing because sportsbooks are prohibited from knowingly 
accepting bets from athletes, coaches, and officials on events in 
which they participate.62 Sportsbooks are also required to obtain and 
share customer information with regulators upon request, and report 
suspicious wagering activity.63 
The Nevada gaming industry produces a substantial portion of the 
total revenues for the state’s General Fund.64 Nevada taxes operators’ 
gross gaming revenues at a 6.75% tax rate, and in 2017, sports 
betting revenue totaled $248.8 million, which in turn generated $15 
million in tax proceeds to the state.65 Because Nevada has the lowest 
gross gaming tax in the nation, this amount is low compared to the 
total volume wagered. However, travelers commonly flock to Las 
Vegas to wager on popular sporting events, such as the Super Bowl, 
and this figure ignores indirect revenues brought to hotels, 
restaurants, rental cars, and entertainment.66 Thus, states that have 
legalized sports betting are not only expecting increased revenues 
                                                                                                             
 60. BERNHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 5. 
 61. Nevada Sports Betting, supra note 30. To place a mobile bet, an individual must complete a 
Nevada sports application account in person and provide the sportsbook with a government-issued 
identification and social security number. Id. 
 62. BERNHARD ET AL., supra note 23, at 48 (explaining how Nevada sportsbooks identified 
suspicious betting activity on Arizona State University basketball games, and ultimately aided law 
enforcement in apprehending the culprits). 
 63. Id. at 47. 
 64. NEV. RESORT ASS’N, 2017 NEVADA GAMING FACT BOOK 3 (2017). In 2017, licensing fees and 
taxation on gaming revenues enabled Nevada hotel-casinos to generate $1.6 billion in industry-specific 
taxes, which accounted for 42% of the General Fund’s yearly tax revenues. Id. at 3, 19. 
 65. Id. at 19 (while Nevada’s revenue attributable to sports betting was only $15 million in 2017, the 
state has the lowest gross gaming tax in the nation at 6.75%). 
 66. GLOB. MKT. ADVISORS, AN EXAMINATION OF SPORTS BETTING IN AMERICA & FORECAST OF 
REVENUES BY STATE 1 (2017), http://globalmarketadvisors.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/GMA_An-Examination-of-Sports-Betting-in-America-Forecast-of-Revenues-
by-State_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PEK-7C4D]. For a detailed report on the direct and indirect 
economic impact that legalized sports betting would have on individual states, see generally OXFORD 
ECON., supra note 46. 
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from sports gambling, but expect increased tourism revenues, 
especially from neighboring out-of-state residents who wish to take 
advantage of legal sports gambling.67 
1.   Delaware Model 
On June 5, 2018, Delaware became the first state other than 
Nevada to legalize unrestricted sports betting.68 Due to the PASPA 
carve-out exception, the Delaware Lottery has allowed multi-game 
parlay betting on NFL games since 2009.69 With approximately 100 
sports lottery retail outlets located across the state, the Delaware 
Lottery in 2017 took in $48 million in multi-game NFL parlay 
wagers, yielding a tax revenue of $8.6 million for the state.70 
Regarding unrestricted, full-scale sports betting, bets can be placed 
with sportsbooks at the state’s three casinos, and the Delaware 
Lottery is responsible for regulatory oversight.71 Further, although 
Delaware law does allow mobile betting, it does not allow online 
betting.72 Gamblers are additionally limited to wagering a maximum 
of $1,000 on a single bet, but this limitation may be removed if the 
casino’s risk manager approves the bettor based on past 
transactions.73 Unlike the Nevada model where the state directly 
taxes a casino’s gross gaming revenue, the Delaware Lottery has a 
                                                                                                             
 67. See generally OXFORD ECON., supra note 46. 
 68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4825 (2017); see also Darren Rovell, Delaware First State to Offer 
Sports Betting Since Supreme Court Ruling, ESPN (June 5, 2018), 
http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/23705846/delaware-becomes-first-state-offer-sports-betting-
supreme-court-ruling [https://perma.cc/BK4D-D7SZ]. 
 69. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4825; see also Brandt, supra note 2, at 278. 
 70. David Purdum, Delaware Draws $322,135 in Bets on Day 1 of Full-Scale Betting Tuesday, 
ESPN (June 6, 2018), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/23716636/delaware-generates-322135-
bets-day-1-full-scale-betting-tuesday [https://perma.cc/54US-WWAF]; see also Delaware Sports 
Lottery, DEL. LOTTERY GAMES, https://www.delottery.com/Sports-Lottery/Monthly-Net-Proceeds 
[https://perma.cc/75B2-KB4K] (providing a complete breakdown of monthly lottery revenues earned at 
casino sportsbooks and retail outlets). 
 71. See generally 10 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 204 (2018); see also Rovell, supra note 68. 
 72. 10 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 204. 
 73. PJ Walsh, What We’ve Learned From Day 1 of Delaware Sports Betting, ACTION NETWORK 
(June 7, 2018, 4:35 PM), https://www.actionnetwork.com/news/legal-delaware-sports-betting-day-1-
what-we-learned [https://perma.cc/9WSW-HKJ3] (attributing the sportsbooks’ imposed betting limit to 
Delaware’s cautious approach and also detailing how a bettor’s historical interactions with a sportsbook 
will affect his ability to wager more than $1,000). 
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revenue-sharing partnership with its casinos where the lottery 
receives 50% of the proceeds, the casinos receive 40%, and the 
remaining 10% is allocated to supplement horse racing purses.74 
Notably, distribution percentages of sports-betting income earned at 
these casino sportsbooks differ substantially from that of income 
earned through sports lottery retail outlets, which after paying a small 
percentage for vendor fees and retailer commissions, allocates 90% 
of the proceeds to the state and the remaining 10% to horse racing 
purses.75 
From June 5, 2018, through September 2019, bettors wagered over 
$156.4 million at the three casino sportsbooks and generated a net 
revenue of $19.06 million, with the state earning over $8.3 million in 
taxable revenue.76 This figure does not count the $9.14 million in tax 
revenue generated during the same time period from NFL parlay 
wagering, which remains available in about 100 lottery retail 
locations around the state.77 Given the favorable tax arrangement, 
research firm Eilers & Krejcik Gaming, LLC projects Delaware 
could receive sports betting revenues of at least $23.1 million 
annually and as much as $49.6 million once mobile betting is 
implemented.78 Rather than standing idle, Delaware seamlessly 
instituted a comprehensive sports betting framework and effortlessly 
capitalized on American’s longstanding appetite to wager on sports. 
2.   Nevada Model—New Jersey and Mississippi Follow Suit 
On June 12, 2018, New Jersey legalized sports gambling, allowing 
individuals to place wagers at licensed casino or racetrack locations 
                                                                                                             
 74. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4815 (2017); see also DEL. DEP’T OF FIN., DELAWARE FISCAL 
NOTEBOOK 131 (2017), https://finance.delaware.gov/publications/fiscal_notebook_17/Section07/ 
lottery.pdf [https://perma.cc/QAQ9-NQKT]; NEV. GAMING COMM’N, supra note 58, at 28, 30. 
 75. See DEL. DEP’T OF FIN., supra note 74 (providing a breakdown between the revenue allocation 
differences between casino sportsbooks and lottery sports retailers); Candee, supra note 58. 
 76. DEL. LOTTERY GAMES, supra note 70 (providing net monthly distribution totals between the 
three Delaware casinos sportsbooks and one hundred sports retailer outlets); see also US Sports Betting 
Revenue and Handle, LEGAL SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sports-betting/revenue/ 
[https://perma.cc/MGX3-69E6] (last updated Oct. 31, 2019). 
 77. DEL. LOTTERY GAMES, supra note 70. 
 78. Rovell, supra note 68. 
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throughout the state.79 Unlike Delaware, these operators are 
permitted to accept mobile bets, and like Nevada, will use 
geolocation tracking to ensure that all bets are placed within New 
Jersey state lines.80 Under the law, the revenue from bets placed in 
person is subject to an 8.5% tax, while sums received from mobile 
wagering are taxed at 13%.81 Operators began accepting bets on June 
14, 2018, and bettors wagered $16.4 million through June 30, 2018.82 
In the fifteen months since legalization, New Jersey quickly rivaled 
Nevada as the preeminent sports betting state with a handle over $4.2 
billion and total revenue of over $284 million, $37 million of which 
has been generated in tax earnings.83 Despite New Jersey sportsbooks 
accepting more than twenty-five times as much betting volume as 
Delaware’s sportsbooks, New Jersey’s tax model only yielded 
roughly $29 million more in tax revenue, and this figure shrinks to 
approximately $20 million if revenue from Delaware’s sports lottery 
retail outlets is included. Although these figures do not reflect the 
ancillary economic benefits derived by the New Jersey casino and 
entertainment industry, the tax revenue differential between 
Delaware and New Jersey serves to highlight how states are able to 
creatively tailor their regulatory and economic infrastructures to 
profit from legalized sports gambling. 
                                                                                                             
 79. S.J. Res. 4111, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018); Eric Ramsey, New Jersey Sports Betting Is 
Finally Here, as Governor Signs Bill, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 11, 2018), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/21121/new-jersey-governor-signs-sports-betting-into-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/F4NK-2GVK]. 
 80. David Purdum, New Jersey Adding Mobile Sports Betting to Offerings, ABC NEWS (Aug. 1, 
2018, 4:36 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/jersey-adding-mobile-sports-betting-
offerings/story?id=56974549 [https://perma.cc/9QPS-XPNF]. 
 81. N.J. S.J. Res. 4111; David Danzis, Murphy Signs Bill Directing Sports Betting Taxes to CRDA, 
PRESS ATLANTIC CITY (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/business/murphy-signs-bill-
directing-sports-betting-taxes-to-crda/article—9ca812f1-54fb-532e-b9e2-7dfa32b5b752.html. 
 82. Ben Fawkes, Debut of New Jersey Sports Betting Sees More Than $16.4M Wagered in June, 
ESPN (July 12, 2018), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/24079224/new-jersey-takes-164-million-
sports-bets-june [https://perma.cc/V6GC-CFLS]. 
 83. For a comprehensive monthly breakdown of revenue earned at each sportsbook, see US Sports 
Betting Revenue and Handle, supra note 76. See also Monthly Sports Wagering Revenue Reports, DEP’T 
L. & PUB. SAFETY, https://www.nj.gov/oag/ge/swrtaxreturns.html [https://perma.cc/5PT5-6RDZ] (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2020). 
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On August 1, 2018, Mississippi became the third state to legalize 
sports betting after the Court struck down PASPA.84 Mississippi 
regulations permit the state’s twenty-eight existing gaming license 
holders to apply for a sports betting license and operate a retail 
sportsbook within the casino.85 Most notably, Mississippi, unlike 
other states, does not permit mobile wagering unless a bettor is 
located within the casino premises.86 Sports betting revenue will be 
taxed at 12%, with 8% going to the state and 4% going to local 
governments.87 In August 2018, Mississippi casinos began accepting 
bets. As of the end of September 2019, they accepted almost $373 
million in wagers and yielded over $40 million in revenue, $5 million 
of which went to the state.88 
B.   Georgia: Constitutional Prohibitions, Casino Legislation & 
HOPE Scholarship 
As one of the nation’s most conservative gambling states, 
Georgia’s path for legalized sports betting is more complicated than 
other states’. The Georgia Constitution prohibits casinos, and all 
states that legalized and launched sports betting platforms offer 
wagering primarily through casino sportsbooks.89 Although the 
Georgia legislature narrowly rejected casino proposals in the past, the 
issue will likely confront the General Assembly again in the 2020 
session when State Representative Ron Stephens (R-164th), a leading 
                                                                                                             
 84.  See David Purdum, Mississippi Casinos Begin Taking Sports Wagers, ESPN (Aug. 7, 2018), 
http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/24257989/mississippi-casinos-begin-taking-sports-wagers 
[https://perma.cc/TX6Y-SSDT]. See generally MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-76-89 (2016); 13-9 MISS. CODE 
R. § 2.1 (LexisNexis 2018). 
 85. 13-9 MISS. CODE R. § 2.1. 
 86. Id. at § 3.15; Purdum, supra note 84. 
 87. Jill R. Dorson, Mississippi Rolls Out Regs: No ‘Integrity Fee,’ Ok to Bet on Mississippi College 
Teams, SPORTS HANDLE (June 21, 2018), https://sportshandle.com/mississippi-rolls-out-regs-no-
integrity-fee-ok-to-bet-on-mississippi-college-teams/ [https://perma.cc/8JEJ-JDLG]. 
 88. US Sports Betting Revenue and Handle, supra note 76. See also Monthly Reports, MISS. 
GAMING COMMISSION, http://www.msgamingcommission.com/index.php/reports/monthly_reports 
[https://perma.cc/774W-N43Z] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020), for a breakdown of revenue earned from 
specific casinos. 
 89. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 8. 
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proponent of gaming, plans to introduce another bill proposing a 
constitutional amendment to legalize casinos.90 
Proponents contend that casinos will not only create jobs and 
stimulate economic activity, but will also generate stable tax 
revenues that can be used to fund Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship.91 
The HOPE Scholarship is a merit-based program that provides 
funding for Georgia students to attend in-state colleges and is entirely 
lottery funded.92 Though the scholarship was controversial at first 
and experienced strong resistance from religious groups who claimed 
lotteries would cause gambling addictions and financial ruin for 
many individuals, the constitutional amendment to institute a state 
lottery narrowly passed the state referendum.93 In the years since, the 
HOPE Scholarship has been considered a monumental success by 
giving over $18.7 billion to help more than 1.7 million Georgia 
students attend college.94 However, because the HOPE Scholarship is 
                                                                                                             
 90. Mark Niesse, Gambling, Guns and Taxes Fall Short in Georgia Generally Assembly, ATLANTA 
J.-CONST. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/gambling-guns-
and-taxes-fall-short-georgia-general-assembly/dVz5IJexBFbWfu4aHrjI9L/# [https://perma.cc/Y8VD-
XPRW] (discussing how House Resolution 327, which would allow casino gambling in Georgia, failed 
to reach the House floor). See generally Ella McDonald, Gaming Lobbyists Continue to Push for 
Casinos in Georgia, LEGAL GAMBLING & L. (Jan. 5, 2018), 
https://www.legalgamblingandthelaw.com/news/gaming-lobbyists-continue-to-push-for-casinos-in-
georgia-as-legislative-session-starts/ [https://perma.cc/42HC-R7DL] (describing previous futile attempts 
to pass casino legislation); Don McKee, Effects on Governor’s Race: Changing Attitudes on Gambling, 
MARIETTA DAILY J. (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.mdjonline.com/opinion/don-mckee-effects-on-
governor-s-race-changing-attitudes-on/article_1719097c-a1cd-11e8-ab43-eb9d693af55c.html 
[https://perma.cc/M5TV-HY2S]. Stephens previously sought support for three resort-style casinos that 
would require each company bidding on a state license to invest at least $1.2 billion dollars, and the 
project would be expected to generate a minimum of 10,000 new jobs for a total $3.6 billion investment. 
McKee, supra. 
 91. Jarred Schenke, New Georgia Push for Legalized Gambling Includes 3 Billion-Dollar Casino 
Resorts, BISNOW ATLANTA (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.bisnow.com/atlanta/news/economy/three-site-
casinos-eyed-for-georgia-including-metro-atlanta-91337 [https://perma.cc/FS2V-LNNY]; Dave 
Williams, Legalized Gambling Supporters in Georgia Vowing Legislation in 2019, ATLANTA BUS. 
CHRON. (Mar. 21, 2018, 1:21 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2018/03/21/legalized-
gambling-supporters-in-georgiavowing.html [https://perma.cc/W3XB-QPJC]. See generally Greg 
Rossino & Ryan Kruger, New Analysis Shows HOPE Scholarship to Run Out of Money by 2028, 
11ALIVE (Aug. 10, 2016, 7:07 PM), https://www.11alive.com/article/news/local/new-analysis-shows-
hope-scholarship-to-run-out-of-money-by-2028/293407419 [https://perma.cc/84UJ-6WGH]. 
 92. James Barlament, HOPE Scholarship, NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/education/hope-scholarship [https://perma.cc/669S-GA75] 
(last updated Apr. 30, 2019). 
 93. Lanford, supra note 55, at 7. 
 94. Georgia Lottery Corp., supra note 56. 
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funded entirely by lottery proceeds, the scholarship is susceptible to 
funding shortages since individuals purchase lottery tickets less 
frequently during economic downturns.95 Due to a growing 
population size, there are concerns the HOPE Scholarship may not be 
able to sustain its demand, with some predicting it will run out by 
2028.96 Regardless of the sustainability of the scholarship fund, 
gaming revenues could be used to either augment the HOPE 
Scholarship or serve other areas of state need, such as health care, 
education, or infrastructure. 
1.   Alternative Route via State Lottery 
Given the legislative hurdles impeding casino introduction, the 
simpler avenue for instituting sports betting in Georgia rests with the 
Georgia Lottery. For a number of years, the Delaware and Oregon 
lotteries have offered multi-game parlay betting on NFL games 
through state retail outlets such as restaurants, gas stations, and 
convenience stores.97 Before being outlawed, the Oregon Lottery 
consistently yielded approximately $2 million in annual state 
revenue, and the Delaware sports lottery most recently returned over 
$8.6 million in 2017, which was the final year before full-scale sports 
betting was permitted.98 Although these figures may not seem overly 
                                                                                                             
 95. Sarah Butrymowicz & Meredith Kolodner, $500M in HOPE Reserves Idle While Students Drop 
Out, Drown in Loans, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.myajc.com/news/500m-hope-
reserves-idle-while-students-drop-out-drown-loans/yyRVOvXi5xsYBuFBpxTk0I/ 
[https://perma.cc/9Z8J-TQA9] (describing how HOPE reserve funds have grown in recent years to 
combat the growing challenges of funding such a generous scholarship); see also Kim Severson, 
Georgia Facing a Hard Choice on Free Tuition, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/us/07hope.html [https://perma.cc/AE7K-4EZH]. As a result of the 
HOPE Scholarship’s popularity, in the aftermath of the Great Recession and end of federal stimulus 
packages, lottery sales could not cover the program’s costs. Severson, supra. In 2010 and 2011, lottery 
sales were short by $243 million and $317 million respectively, and Georgia lawmakers were forced to 
allocate millions of dollars from the state’s reserve fund. Id. 
 96. Schenke, supra note 91. 
 97. Anthony G. Galasso, Jr., Betting Against the House (and Senate): The Case for Legal, 
State-Sponsored Sports Wagering in a Post-PASPA World, 99 KY. L.J. 163, 168 (2011) (noting in 1989, 
the Oregon Lottery permitted multi-game parlay betting on NFL games, yielding approximately $2 
million in annual state revenue); see also Meer, supra note 29, at 288–89. Despite the relative success of 
the Oregon sports lottery, the lottery was outlawed in 2007 as the NCAA, long opposed to sports 
wagering, boycotted Oregon stadiums from hosting post-season collegiate basketball games. Id. 
 98. Galasso, Jr., supra note 97, at 168–69; Purdum, supra note 70; see also Nicholaus Garcia, 
Oregon Lottery Projects $100 Million in Annual Revenue from Legal Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS 
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impressive, greater potential lies beneath the surface. First, neither of 
these states offered mobile betting, which is expected to be the 
driving force behind future sports wagering growth as individuals can 
place bets remotely without having to drive to a physical location. 
Second, statistically, parlay bets are considerably more difficult to 
win because a bettor must win multiple games to collect a winning 
ticket, whereas betting on a single game offers a 50% chance of 
success. Absent the most risk-seeking bettors, individuals 
traditionally prefer to wager on single games rather than placing 
parlay bets. Finally, the tax figures from the Delaware and Oregon 
lotteries only produce revenue during the months when professional 
football games are played. Because the NFL season only runs from 
August to the first weekend of February, the majority of months earn 
no revenue. Given that Georgia already has a state lottery and also 
has a population nearly ten times greater than that of Delaware’s, it is 
not presumptuous to predict that significant tax revenues from sports 
betting could be available to the Peach State.99 In fact, a 2017 Oxford 
Economics report projects that even with limited wagering 
availability and a base tax rate, Georgia could conservatively 
generate nearly $100 million in sports betting revenue each year.100 
C.   Opposing Rationales & Hypocritical Ideology 
Opposition to sports betting continues to rest on moral, religious, 
or financial grounds.101 Some opponents claim that tax revenues from 
                                                                                                             
REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/24409/oregon-lottery-sports-betting-revenue/ 
[https://perma.cc/XX77-P6LT] (last updated Sept. 26, 2018). According to a recent report, Oregon 
lottery officials believe that the addition of mobile betting could net the state over $120 million in 
revenue from sports betting annually. Garcia, supra. 
 99. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK FACTS DELAWARE (2017), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/de 
[https://perma.cc/UGL6-AGET] [hereinafter QUICK FACTS DELAWARE] (noting Delaware’s population 
was 961,939 as of July 1, 2017); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK FACTS GEORGIA (2017), 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/ga [https://perma.cc/H4HN-54BK] [hereinafter QUICK FACTS 
GEORGIA] (noting Georgia’s population was 10,429,379 as of July 1, 2017). 
 100. James Swift, Local Legislators Shaky on Sports Betting Legalization, DAILY TRIB. NEWS (June 
2, 2018), http://www.daily-tribune.com/stories/local-legislators-shaky-on-sports-betting-
legalization,19009 [https://perma.cc/ULM4-RSVT]. 
 101. Polisano, supra note 3, at 485; Elaine S. Povich, How States Are Gambling on Sports Betting 
Case, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/01/31/how-states-are-gambling-on-sports-betting-case 
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sports betting will produce short-term gains, with states that legalize 
shortly after Murphy experiencing brief economic success until 
neighboring states follow suit and saturate the marketplace.102 Other 
critics claim that the tax revenue proceeds the state would receive 
would not be large enough to justify legalization.103 Although many 
factors will affect the amount of revenue a state earns from sports 
betting, such as population size, tax rates, and the presence of mobile 
betting, proponents of legalization contend that the extent to which 
profits are generated is largely irrelevant as sports betting is 
inevitable, and any revenues should be directed to benefit state 
governments instead of illegal bookmakers or offshore companies.104 
Regardless of the merits of these arguments, it is necessary to 
identify the hypocrisy underlying the opposition’s rationales against 
legalizing sports betting in a state that has a lottery. At their core, the 
differences between playing the lottery and betting on a sporting 
event are quite minute. For instance, when an individual player plays 
the Powerball, she is betting that the numbers she has selected will be 
randomly chosen and she will be rewarded for her correct prediction. 
Undisputedly, this is gambling and virtually identical to when a 
sports bettor wagers that one team will outscore the other, and in 
doing so, the sports bettor will be rewarded for her correct prediction. 
Moreover, opponents citing moral and integrity concerns contend 
that match-fixing is likely to increase if sports betting is legalized. 
However, these arguments trigger ironic counterarguments. Before 
                                                                                                             
[https://perma.cc/6DR4-HSQ3]. 
 102. Jill Nolin, Sports Betting Gains May Be Short-Lived, VALDOSTA DAILY TIMES (July 23, 2018), 
https://www.valdostadailytimes.com/news/local_news/sports-betting-gains-may-be-short-
lived/article_57c022e5-0cd2-5b2e-9231-749871c664de.html [https://perma.cc/ZFT7-C3YR] (positing 
that a cannibalizing effect will take place and states that legalize sports betting early will see their 
revenues decrease as newer states move to legalize); see also Povich, supra note 101. 
 103. Howard Gleckman, 6 Reasons Why States Shouldn’t Be Counting Their Sports Betting Tax 
Revenue Yet, FORBES (May 16, 2018, 11:35 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleckman/2018/05/16/six-reasons-why-states-shouldnt-be-
counting-their-sports-betting-tax-revenue-yet/#2a82d33b3897 [https://perma.cc/2MA7-HPB9] 
(predicting that states following the Nevada tax model will not generate material state tax revenues and 
referencing Nevada’s $15 million in tax revenue as support). 
 104. Povich, supra note 101 (quoting Minnesota State Representative Pat Garofalo’s stance that 
“hundreds of thousands of Minnesotans already wager on sports” and inferring legalization will shift 
gambling away from the underground and into a transparent and regulated marketplace). 
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and throughout PASPA’s enactment, match-fixing scandals plagued 
sporting events, thus demonstrating that an unregulated marketplace 
has not effectively preserved the purity of sporting outcomes.105 
Historically, government intervention has been implemented to 
decrease corruption by curbing certain actions and opportunities, yet 
it remains unclear why sports betting opponents believe an inverse 
relationship exists in a regulated marketplace. 
III.   Proposal 
As more states legalize sports betting, Georgia should follow suit 
and move to allow for a vote to amend its constitution. As of October 
31, 2019, thirteen states have already accepted bets on sporting 
events, including nearby states such as Kentucky, South Carolina, 
and Louisiana.106 Quite simply, sports betting is only going to grow, 
and states that do not permit sports betting will reject a stable flow of 
tax revenues.107 Further, residents of states that do not offer sports 
betting will travel to neighboring states to bet and will instead 
contribute to those states’ tax revenues. 
A.   Why Georgia Should Legalize 
Critics will continue to rely on moral and religious grounds, such 
as potential increases in gambling addiction, as their basis of 
opposition. For instance, Representative Matthew Gambill (R-15th) 
is not a proponent of sports betting because he believes it has a 
“deleterious social impact.”108 Regardless of the merits of these 
arguments, Georgia already has a state lottery, which effectively 
renders these contentions moot given the similarities between playing 
                                                                                                             
 105. See United States v. Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Fielkow et 
al., supra note 3, at 29; Underwood, supra note 38 (discussing a scheme to shave points by Boston 
College basketball players during the 1978-79 season). 
 106. Legislative Tracker: Sports Betting, supra note 52. As of October 31, 2019, thirteen states offer 
full-scale sports betting. Id. 
 107. SCHWARTZ, supra note 26. Nevada sportsbooks have been profitable for at least thirty-three 
consecutive years. Id. 
 108. Swift, supra note 100. Any sports betting legislation would likely begin with the Senate 
Committee on Regulated Industries and Utilities, who would draft initial frameworks and then present 
different scenarios to the state Senate. Id. 
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the lottery and betting on a sporting event. It is perplexing how 
opponents of sports betting categorically differentiate between the 
moral and social righteousness of playing the lottery, drinking 
alcohol, or smoking cigarettes with betting on sports, and even more 
confounding why the formers of these so-called vice activities are 
legally and socially permitted while sports betting is illegal.109 
Even assuming Representative Gambill is correct that betting on 
sports has a “deleterious social impact,” how does gambling on the 
lottery not have a similarly harmful or unvirtuous societal impact? 
Alternatively, what positive social impact does playing the lottery 
provide that sports betting fails to replicate? Both activities are done 
for either monetary reward or entertainment purposes, yet the odds of 
winning the Powerball or Mega Millions jackpots are infinitesimal, 
whereas betting on a sporting outcome against the point-spread is a 
coin-toss.110 Furthermore, though the majority of Americans wager 
on sports casually, there remains a sizable portion of individuals 
dedicated to betting on sports as a full-time profession.111 Whereas 
gambling on the lottery requires no skill and relies solely on the luck 
of the draw, professional sports bettors research and analyze 
historical scoring trends, team personnel, player tendencies, weather 
reports, coaching schematics, travel schedules, and a host of other 
variables to increase the likelihood of winning their bets.112 Though 
                                                                                                             
 109. See generally Franklin Liu, Sin Taxes: Have Governments Gone Too Far in Their Efforts to 
Monetize Morality?, 59 B.C. L. REV. 763 (2018) (providing a comparison of traditional and 
non-traditional sin taxes). Many goods and services, such as alcohol, tobacco, gambling, candy, and soft 
drinks, are subject to state “sin taxes” because their consumption is deemed harmful to individuals or 
socially undesirable. Id. at 764. The rationale for these taxes is that, as opposed to traditional sales taxes, 
sin taxes raise the price of such goods in an effort to discourage consumer demand. Id. at 764–65. 
 110. Kevin Breuninger, The Odds of Winning Those Record Powerball, Mega Millions Jackpots Are 
Beyond Slim, CNBC (Jan. 5, 2018, 1:42 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/05/odds-of-winning-a-
lottery-jackpot-are-worse-than-you-expect.html [https://perma.cc/WQ4M-BX6R]. The odds of winning 
the Powerball grand prize are 1 in 292.2 million while the odds of winning the Mega Millions jackpot 
are 1 in 302.5 million. Id. 
 111. See generally Matt Bonesteel, Bob Voulgaris Made Millions Betting on the NBA. The Mavs Are 
Gambling on Him, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2018, 7:58 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2018/10/05/bob-voulgaris-made-millions-betting-nba-mavs-
are-gambling-him/?utm_term=.04892d66b4fe [https://perma.cc/46YM-S3PX]. In October 2018, the 
Dallas Mavericks hired former professional sports bettor Bob Voulgaris to be the director of their 
quantitative research and development department. Id. As a gambler, Voulgaris successfully studied 
game-management tendencies of three NBA teams to make millions of dollars betting. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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notable differences exist between betting and investing, in this 
regard, professional gamblers predicting and wagering on sporting 
outcomes mirrors the work of stock market analysts who similarly 
employ technical and fundamental analysis to determine an entity’s 
intrinsic value and predict its future success.113 
As to integrity concerns, lotteries have quite the checkered past 
when it comes to preventing corruption; fraudulent conduct was a 
leading factor in the nationwide lottery prohibition throughout the 
early nineteenth century.114 However, since lotteries reappeared in 
the early 1970s, strict state regulatory oversight has been effective in 
reducing the risk of corruption, and modern lottery fraud cases 
typically involve external actors rather than internal institutional 
operators.115 Similarly, a regulated marketplace for betting on sports, 
as opposed to an unregulated environment run via illegal, organized 
crime, logically seems far better suited to preserve the character and 
integrity of sporting outcomes. 
Additionally, sportsbooks are motivated to offer a fair and 
trustworthy platform to retain the trust of sports bettors and thus 
share the same integrity concerns as professional and collegiate 
sports leagues.116 As such, a regulated framework encourages and 
incentivizes oversight while simultaneously protecting the integrity 
of sporting events. In fact, Nevada sportsbooks have a history of 
reporting and preventing numerous point-shaving schemes and have 
                                                                                                             
 113. See generally Stock Market vs. Sports Betting: How Investing and Gambling Differ, SPORTS 
BETTING DIME (last updated Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.sportsbettingdime.com/guides/finance/how-
investing-and-gambling-differ/ [https://perma.cc/UM5V-LMWS]. In addition to fundamental and 
technical analysis, behavioral analysis plays a significant role in both investing and gambling. Id. In the 
investment arena, investors are over three times more likely to invest with local firms where similarly 
casual sports bettors frequently bet irrationally on teams they root to win regardless of market signals. 
Id. 
 114. Rychlak, supra note 9, at 13, 35 (detailing how fraudulent conduct diminished the public’s 
perception of lotteries and contributed to the prohibition of lotteries from the late 1800s until 1964, and 
providing instances where internal lottery operators were accused of fixing drawings and 
misappropriating funds). 
 115. Id. at 60 (discussing the strict regulatory control modern lotteries are subject to, and providing 
that present fraud cases deal with issues such as altered tickets, awarding the prize to the wrong winner, 
and instances where an undisputed winner loses the ticket). 
 116. Todd Dewey, Las Vegas Bookmakers Know a Fix When They See One, L.V. REV.-J. (Sept. 8, 
2017, 2:19 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/betting/las-vegas-bookmakers-know-a-fix-
when-they-see-one/ [https://perma.cc/XPE6-T282]. 
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worked alongside law enforcement to apprehend potential 
conspirators.117 Although no industry will ever be immune to scandal 
or rogue actors, a regulated sports betting market aligns all parties’ 
interests and promotes transparency, whereas unregulated bookies 
operate under the guise of underground secrecy and self-interest. 
From a political standpoint, Georgia Governor Brian Kemp 
opposes sports betting and referenced the 2018 NCAA College 
Football Playoff Final between Alabama and Georgia in his critique, 
saying “[a]s a Georgia grad and diehard Dawg fan, losing the 
national championship was painful enough. [It] [w]ould have been 
even worse if I had money on the game!”118 However, had sports 
betting been legalized, Governor Kemp would be no more obligated 
to bet on a sporting event than he would be obligated to buy a 
Powerball ticket. Thus, just like playing the lottery is discretionary, 
Governor Kemp could simply have decided not to bet. In contrast, 
former gubernatorial candidate Stacey Abrams was open to the topic 
of sports betting so long as the tax revenues are earmarked toward 
improving Georgia’s educational systems.119 This proposal is neutral 
with respect to where the revenues go, and only proposes that sports 
legislation take effect because of the relative ease with which 
Georgia could generate millions of dollars merely by taxing an 
activity that is inevitable, prevalently ongoing, and currently evading 
taxation.120 
                                                                                                             
 117. Id.; see also John Grady & Annie Clement, Gambling and Collegiate Sport, 15 J. LEGAL 
ASPECTS SPORT 95, 99 (2005). In 1994, the Mirage sportsbook alerted the Nevada Gaming Control 
Board of suspicious betting activity on a collegiate basketball game between Arizona State and 
Washington. Dewey, supra note 116. Sportsbook officials at the Mirage had received over $525,000 in 
bets on this game, while the traditional volume on such a game would only attract around $40,000. Id. 
An FBI investigation ensued and ultimately two players, Steven Smith and Isaac Burton, plead guilty to 
charges of conspiracy to commit sports bribery. Grady & Clement, supra, at 99.  
 118. Jason Butt, Could Sports Betting Actually Make Its Way to Georgia?, TELEGRAPH (June 13, 
2018, 11:30 AM), https://www.macon.com/sports/college/university-of-georgia/bulldogs-beat/uga-
football/article213092154.html. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. Even under a conservative tax framework and limited wagering availability, Oxford 
Economics predicts Georgia could net approximately $100 million in revenues from sports betting each 
year. OXFORD ECON., supra note 46, at 29. 
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B.   Regulatory Framework 
Given the absence and future uncertainty of casinos in the state, 
the Georgia Lottery is the most logical institutional mechanism 
through which to introduce and regulate statewide sports betting. For 
an introductory guide, Georgia lawmakers would be wise to mimic 
the two-tiered regulatory structure first established in Nevada.121 The 
first step would be to create a state gaming commission that would be 
responsible for establishing statewide regulations while delegating 
administrative, regulatory, and collection functions to the Georgia 
Lottery. Second, lawmakers interested in maximizing tax revenues 
should emulate aspects of Delaware’s sports lottery retail model, 
wherein, after paying retailers a 5% sales commissions, the 
remaining percentage of the proceeds go to the state’s general 
fund.122 
The most efficient, safe, and lucrative betting infrastructure would 
entail allowing the Georgia Lottery to set up its own retail outlets 
designated specifically for sports wagering that are equipped with 
lottery personnel to handle bets and payouts. Although Delaware’s 
sports lottery permits NFL parlay betting at retail outlets such as 
convenience stores and restaurants, this infrastructure model is 
unlikely replicable for a state offering unrestricted sports betting, 
given that its limited betting menu requires only minimal employee 
training and lacks regulatory safeguards to identify suspicious 
wagering activity. Instead, lottery-operated, brick-and-mortar 
sportsbooks would operate similar to casino sportsbooks or betting 
shops in the United Kingdom. However, these sportsbooks, in 
contrast to Delaware’s retail outlets, would be staffed with dedicated 
sports betting personnel and offer widespread betting options.123 In 
                                                                                                             
 121. NEV. GAMING COMM’N, supra note 58, at 8. Pursuant to Nevada law, the Nevada Gaming 
Commission and Nevada Gaming Control Board work in tandem to regulate the state’s gaming industry. 
Id. 
 122.  See DEL. DEP’T OF FIN., supra note 74. After winning payouts, vendor fees, and retailer 
commissions are paid, 90% of revenues go to the general fund and the remaining 10% supplement horse 
racing purses. Id. Vendor fees include central computer system and terminal equipment. Id. at 133–34. 
 123. Zach Schreiber, The Time Is Now: Why the United States Should Adopt the British Model of 
Sports Betting Legislation, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 353, 371, 375 (2017). 
Motivated to eliminate illegal bookmaking operations, the British Parliament passed the Betting and 
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addition to creating new jobs, these lottery-operated sportsbooks 
would allow regulatory personnel to handle all bets and uniformly 
monitor suspicious wagering activities across different operating 
locations. 
Finally, the financial benefits that accompany legalization are 
simply too lucrative to ignore and would provide Georgia with a new 
source of stable tax revenues that can be used to improve specific 
programs and sectors of state concern. Though the true size of the 
Georgia sports betting market is impossible to discern in its current 
unregulated state, economic models and the recent success in New 
Jersey and Delaware suggest sports betting could yield somewhere in 
the vicinity of $50 million to $100 million in initial tax revenues.124 
Although Georgia has no experience in the sports-betting 
marketplace, it has a population over ten times the size of 
Delaware’s, is home to four professional sports teams, and is 
centrally located in the heartland of collegiate football.125 Even under 
a conservative approach, Georgia stands to earn millions of dollars in 
tax revenues, and the potential for annual revenues reaching $100 
million does not seem implausible. 
Regardless of the framework ultimately drafted, proposed 
legislation should explicitly discuss any administrative limitations on 
sports wagering and enumerate individual rights and limitations 
applicable to individuals placing bets to create a transparent and 
trustworthy marketplace. For example, in an effort to diminish the 
potential for bribery of collegiate athletes, New Jersey law prohibits 
sportsbooks from offering wagers involving New Jersey college 
football teams.126 In contrast, the Nevada and Mississippi regulations 
                                                                                                             
Gaming Act of 1960, which legalized betting shops to accept sports wagers. Id. at 371. British betting 
shops are the functional equivalents of casino sportsbooks but are located in traditional retail locations 
throughout the country. Id. at 375. 
 124. See generally OXFORD ECON., supra note 46. 
 125. QUICK FACTS DELAWARE, supra note 99; QUICK FACTS GEORGIA, supra note 99. See generally 
Neil Irwin & Kevin Quealy, The Places in America Where College Football Means the Most, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/upshot/the-places-in-america-where-
college-football-means-the-most.html [https://perma.cc/H6BS-D7A8] (explaining the greater popularity 
of college football in the Southern states as compared to the rest of the nation). 
 126. S.J. Res. 4111, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018). 
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have no restriction to betting on in-state collegiate teams.127 
Additionally, even if lawmakers are reluctant to permit mobile 
betting, which is understandable based on Georgia’s relatively barren 
gambling landscape, proposed legislation should be sufficiently 
flexible to allow for such betting at a later date. This hybrid model 
provides a general framework and combines the best attributes of 
casino sportsbooks, namely full-scale betting options and regulatory 
oversight, with the tax advantages of Delaware’s sports retail model 
to provide a financially successful and transparent sports betting 
marketplace. 
CONCLUSION 
With the repeal of PASPA, states are presented with the unique 
opportunity to enter into a mature marketplace and capitalize on a 
previously unavailable source of taxable revenue. States that have 
already implemented sports-betting platforms are already 
experiencing the financial benefits and are able to reinvest these 
dividends to bolster public education, health care systems, highway 
infrastructures, or other cash starved programs. Georgia has the 
opportunity to follow the lead of such states by crafting its own 
unique regulatory system that will allow for millions of dollars in 
annual tax revenues to be earned while preserving the sanctity of 
sporting outcomes. 
Critics still rely on stale, outdated, and uninformed positions, and 
ignore the inescapable truth that sports betting is inevitable and 
Americans will gamble on sports regardless of legality. Rather than 
continuing to allow sports wagers to escape state taxation, 
anti-gambling lawmakers should concede this inevitability and take 
advantage of the opportunity to financially supplement 
undercapitalized state programs. In the event sports betting is 
legalized, these opponents and other uninterested state citizens can 
simply choose not to participate. 
                                                                                                             
 127. Dorson, supra note 87. See generally 13-9 MISS. CODE R. § 2.1 (LexisNexis 2018). 
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The decision in Murphy has firmly cemented legal sports betting as 
a reality of twenty-first century culture, and in the years to follow, 
more states will legalize and capitalize on America’s affinity to 
wager on sports. Georgia would benefit from heeding the advice of 
NBA Commissioner Adam Silver, who proclaimed sports betting 
“should be brought out of the underground and into the sunlight 
where it can be appropriately monitored and regulated.”128 
 
                                                                                                             
 128. Silver, supra note 50. 
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